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DELEGATION AND THE DEFICIT:
THE GRAMM-RUDMAN ACT
In this century the separation of powers doctrine has been uti-
lized by the Supreme Court to strike down various laws as intru-
sive of one branch of the government into the domain of another
branch.' These decisions have ranged from legislative interfer-
ence with the executive power,2 executive exercise of legislative
functions,8 and unauthorized Congressional creation of judicial in-
The doctrine of separation of powers is derived from Articles 1, I1 and Ill of the Con-
stitution. Article I provides: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States and a House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.
1. Article 11 states in pertinent parts: "The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America," U.S. CONS-r. art. 11, § 1, cl. 1, "the president shall have
power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make treaties, appoint Ambas-
sadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by law." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Article III governs the
judiciary; "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. 1l, § 1, cl. 1. Further evidence of the separation of powers is found in the
"Decision of 1789," referred to in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986). The
"Decision" involved the acceptance of a proposal by James Madison in the first Congress
which rejected the role of Congress in the removal of executive branch officers. See Bow-
sher, 106 S. Ct. at 3187. The "Decision of 1789" was given substantive weight by a modern
court in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
' See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926). In Myers, President Wilson or-
dered that Myers, a postmaster, be removed without the "advice and consent" of the Sen-
ate, as required by statute. Id. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, ruled that the
statute unconstitutionally limited the powers vested in the President by Art. 11. 272 U.S. at
119. Cf. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). In
Humphrey's Executor, a similar statutory limitation on the President's removal power was
upheld. Id. The limitation was distinguished from the Myers case in that Humphrey, the
Federal Trade Commissioner, did not perform a "purely executive function," as did My-
ers. Id. Rather, Humphrey performed "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" functions,
and therefore needed to be free from executive interference. Id. This decision was pivotal
in that it promoted the growth of administrative agencies. See generally Levi, Some Aspects of
Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 376 (1976) (general overview of doctrine);
Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and
the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1099-1108 (1981) (questioning distinc-
tions between "independent" agencies and executive ones).
' See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-84 (1952). In Youngs-
town, President Truman sought to avert an impending nationwide strike by steel companies
by ordering a government seizure of the steel mills. Id. The Supreme Court found this
action to be violative of the separation of powers doctrine, as only Congress could order
such action through their lawmaking power. Id. at 587-89.
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stitutions.' Recent cases have focused on congressional usurpation
of executive power,5 and -have led to decreased congressional
power in overseeing enacted laws.6
" See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-89 (1982). North-
ern Pipeline dealt with the limitations art. Ill placed on Congress' ability to create courts.
Id. at 52-89. Congress, through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 conferred broad au-
thority to bankruptcy judges without granting them life tenure and the salary provisions
provided by art. I1l. Id. at 60-61. The art. Ill guarantee of life tenure was designed to
establish an independent judiciary, free from legislative or executive interference. Id. at
57-60. Because the types of cases the bankruptcy judges heard were historically heard by
art. Ill tribunals, vesting this authority in art. I courts violated the doctrine of separation
of powers. Id.
6 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-55 (1983). Chadha invalidated the use of the
"legislative veto", the practice of issuing concurrent resolutions, which are veto-proof, to
control laws in effect. Id. at 954-55. The Chadha Court concentrated on Congressional use
of such a "veto" to circumvent the decision of the Attorney General regarding the depor-
tation of illegal aliens. Id. at 952. By concurrent resolution, Congress could order the de-
portation of individuals that the Attorney General chose to let remain in the country. Id. at
923-28. By using concurrent, as opposed to joint resolutions, Congress could avoid the
possibility of a Presidential veto. Id. at 954-55. The Court held that this was violative of the
separation of powers doctrine, as it effectively allowed Congress to oversee the execution
of the laws, a function reserved for the executive branch. Id. The Court laid great stress on
the bicameralism aspect of the United States Government, stating that this type of action
can only be carried out by bicameral passage followed by presentment to the president. Id.
The invalidation of the legislative veto had far-reaching implications. More than 300 stat-
utes were subsequently ruled unconstitutuional. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Hernando Bank Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190 (5th Cir. 1984) (one House veto
provision of Reorganization Act of 1977 severable from remainder of Act); Lewis v. Sava,
602 F. Supp. 571, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Immigration and Nationality Act one-House veto
severable). Justice White, in his Chadha dissent, lamented over the broad language used by
the Court, feeling that the legislative veto provided a useful tool for Congressional over-
sight of enacted legislation. Justice White stated, "The prominence of the legislative veto
mechanism in our contemporary political system and its importance to Congress can hardly
be overstated. It has become a central means by which Congress secures, the accountability
of executive and independent agencies." 462 U.S. at 967-68 (White, J., dissenting). See
generally Schwartz, The United States Supreme Court and the Laying of Regulations Before the
Legislature, 100 LAW Q. REV. 9, 11 (1984) (Chadha represents a too-rigid interpretation of
the Constitution, there should be safeguards outside the legislative branch); Note, Re-Sepa-
rating the Powers: The Legislative Veto and Congressional Oversight After Chadha, 33 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 145, 188-89 (1984) 1hereinafter Note, Re-Separating the Powers] (Congress should have
some power to oversee administrative agencies); Note, INS v. Chadha and the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974: A Shift in the Balance of Power, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 684 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Impoundment Control Act] (ruling shifts power to the executive).
Another recent case which held that Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine
was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44 (1976). In Buckley, the Court found that Congress
had violated the doctrine by reserving the right to appoint members of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission, essentially an executive function. Id. at 143-44. See Burkoff, Appointment
and Removal Under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV.
1335, 1336 (1976) (Buckley represents a giant step against Congressional control over
policymaking).
0 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J., dissenting).
Gramm-Rudman Act
In Bowsher v. Synar7 the separation of powers doctrine was in-
voked once again to invalidate provisions of The Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,6 commonly referred
to as the "Gramm-Rudman" Act. At issue in Bowsher was Con-
gress' delegation to the Comptroller General, the Chief of the
General Accounting Office (GAO), of the power to order
mandatory deficit cuts.' The Supreme Court ruled that this provi-
sion violated the separation of powers doctrine, due to the fact
that this function was executive in nature, and Congress' ability to
remove the Comptroller therefore gave it "control" over an exec-
utive function.' 0 Rather than relying on the separation of powers
doctrine in a dogmatic fashion, it is submitted that the Court
should have relied on the delegation doctrine" and in doing so
7 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
* Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1039, (codified at 2 U.S.C.S. § 901) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
* See 2 U.S.C.S. at § 251.
10 See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194 (1986). The Court relied heavily on the
rationale espoused in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Court re-stated the bicam-
eralism concerns which it set forth in Chadha, concerns which were skirted by the Gramm-
Rudman Act. 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
" See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519-28 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-10, 433 (1935). These cases represent the
only true application of the delegation doctrine by the Supreme Court. Panama Refining
involved Presidential intervention with the transport of illegally produced state oil pursu-
ant to Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. 293 U.S. at 405-10. The
Court held that such policymaking functions are properly within the legislative authority of
Congress. Id. at 433. Schechter dealt with Presidential involvement with codemaking in the
poultry industry, again pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act. 295 U.S. at 519-
28. In Schechter, Justice Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama Refining, agreed that grant-
ing such power without constriction was "delegation running riot." Id. at 553. (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
Another case often associated with Panama Refining and Schechter is Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Dicta in Carter indicates that the decision, which involved the
delegation of the ability to set maximum hours and wages to coal producers and mine
workers, was based on the delegation doctrine. Id. at 311. However, close reading of the
case indicates a primary concern with the denial of substantive due process rights. Id.
The Panama Refining and Schechter cases developed the "standards" test, by which nearly
all future constitutional challenges based on the delegation doctrine were to be judged. See
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430. This test involves scruti-
nizing the statute in question to ascertain whether Congress articulated sufficient standards
to confine the judgment of the parties exercising the delegated authority. See Schechter, 245
U.S. at 541-42; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 424-25, (1944) (standards in Emergency Price Control Act adequate); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165-66, (1941) (sufficient standards for Administrator of
Wage & Hour Division to set maximum hours); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312
U.S. 126, 133 (1941) (NLRB supplied adequate standards in determining proper represent-
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would have rendered a ruling with far more practical precedential
value, one which stresses accountability as its goal."' Before dis-
atives in bargaining agreements).
rhe delegation doctrine is not as easily traceable to constitutional provisions as is the
separation of powers doctrine. Among the theories that exist as to its origin is that the
doctrine is derived directly from John Locke's TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, and even
further back to Justininan's DIGEST. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
(1787-1984). 441 n. 11 (5th rev. ed. 1984). The doctrine has also been said to be a corol-
lary of the separation of powers doctrine, see Freedman, Delegation of Powers and Institu-
tional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 312 (1976), as an offshoot of the common law
maxim, "'delegation potestas non protest delegari" - "power that is originally delegated may
not be re-delegated," see id. at 313, and as an aspect of due process: the prevention or
transfer of legislative power to an officer or agency without the restraining influence of
legislative standards. Id. Several early cases recognized the existence of the principle, al-
though none ruled that an unconstitutional delegation had taken place. See Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (Congress cannot delegate legislative authority to the president);
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S.L. (7 Cranch.) 382, 388 (1812) (earliest
judicial notice of doctrine in U.S.). See generally S. BARsER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1975) (general discussion of delegation doctrine); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 215 at 207-08 (2d ed. 1978) (functional analysis of
doctrine).
" See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3202 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens believes that
the type of authority Congress attempts to grant the Comptroller General is not delegable
to Congress' agent. Id. at 3204. Justice Stevens wrote, "if a resolution is intended to make
policy that will bind the Nation and thus is 'legislative in its character and effect'," such
legislation must meet the bicameralism requirements. Id. Since the budget cuts the Comp-
troller General was to make were of such a character, "Congress may not simply delegate
those functions to an agent such as the Congressional Budget Office. Since I am convinced
that the Comptroller General is also fairly deemed to be an agent of Congress, he too
cannot exercise such functions." Id. Justice Stevens' opinion implies that a politically ac-
countable body must make such sweeping national policy decisions. Congressman Jack
Brooks, (D-Texas), is also of the view that accountability is of the utmost importance when
dealing with such important policy decisions. See Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and
the President Pass This Buck?, 64 TEx. L. REV. 131, 132 (1985). Congressman Brooks wrote:
[Tihe separation of powers demanded by the Constitution is founded on values more
fundamental than hypertechnical distinctions between classifications of powers, and
... these values form a sound and independent basis for finding the Act unconstitu-
tional. The nondelegation doctrine is a judicially recognized principle for policing
the separation of powers created by the Constitution. Separation of powers analysis
often focuses solely on whether one branch of government has intruded upon or
abdicated to another branch; in contrast, the nondelegation doctrine also addresses
the extent to which Congress may evade its own constitutionally mandated role by
any delegation, even one that remains within the legislative branch ...Gramm-
Rudman violates essential principles of the Constitution's allocation of powers, and-
even if other separation of powers flaws are cured- . . . the Act is invalid under a
proper understanding and application of the nondelegation doctrine.
Id. at 132-33. Congressman Brooks' attitude is that even where the separation of powers
doctrine is satisfied by placing the automatic cut authority in the hands of an officer not
controllable by Congress, an improper delegation has occurred. See id. at 151. This is due
to the fact that essential policymaking decisions, the type that Congress cannot delegate
even with sufficient standards, would be delegated under the Act. Id. Congressman Brooks'
view is also espoused by Rep. Mike Synar, as a plaintiff challenging the validity of the Act.
Gramm-Rudman Act
cussing this alternative view, a discussion of the machinations of
the Gramm-Rudman Act as enacted will be provided to aid in the
understanding of the doctrine's relevance in this situation.
I. THE BUDGET CRISIS AND RESPONSE
In recent years, the federal deficit has grown to staggering pro-
portions.1 3 Public awareness and concern about this problem has
prompted Congress to take somewhat drastic measures in an ef-
fort to curb this mounting problem."' The Balanced Budget and
See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383-84 (D.D.C 1986). It is submitted that
the Congressmen's analysis, supported by Justice Stevens' concurrence, serves as a better
basis in preventing a lack of accountability which is evident in the Gramm-Rudman Act.
Is
COMPARISON OF FIGURES ON ANNUAL DEFICITS (in billions)
President's 1st Budget 2nd Budget Actual
Budget Resolution Resolution
1985 180.40 181.20 181.20 222.20 est.
1984 188.80 169.90 169.90 185.30
1983 91.50 103.90 103.90 195.40
1982 45.00 37.65 37.65 110.60
1981 15.80 +0.20 27.40 57.90
1980 29.00 23.00 29.80 59.60
1979 60.60 50.90 38.80 27.70
1978 57.75 64.65 61.25 48.80
1977 43.00 50.80 50.60 44.90
1976 51.90 68.82 74.10 66.40
(Figures not adjusted for inflation)
Statements Presented at the Hearing on The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985. Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1985) (table prepared by Congressional Research
Service, Government Division, derived from budget documents) [hereinafter Statements].
This table illustrates the growth of the deficit from 1976 to 1985, in billions of dollars.
As indicated by the figures, the deficit has nearly quadrupled in that time.
"' See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1039, (codified at 2 U.S.C.S. § 901) (Law. Co-op. 1986) §§ 251, 252 (1986). 2
U.S.C.S. § 251 authorizes the CBO and OMB to estimate the amount of the deficit for the
upcoming year. See id. Should that amount exceed the maximum deficit amount established
by Congress in 2 U.S.C.S. § 201(aXI) (1986), the CBO and OMB shall prepare their own
recommendations for the Comptroller General to review. See id. at § 251 . The Comptrol-
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Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 was passed in response to
this disestimable situation.1 The Gramm-Rudman Act sought to
do away with one of the major dilemmas involved with budget
deficit reduction, the inevitable political pressure that accompa-
nies a reduction of federal funding.1 6 Congress sought to apply
pressure both to itself and to the President by grafting into the
Act a process which, should appropriate budget cuts17 fail to be
made, would put the budget-cutting authority into the hands of
the Comptroller General.1 This aspect of the Act was designed to
prompt Congress and the President to set aside differences in en-
acting budget cuts which would gradually eliminate the deficit by
1991.10 Should the budget presented for the year exceed the
"maximum deficit amount," Section 251 of the Act was to come
into play.20 Estimates of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were to be sub-
mitted to the Comptroller General, outlining proposed program-
ler General then issues his report to the President. Id. The President then issues a "seques-
tration order" and the Comptroller's cuts become effective in thirty days. See id. at § 252;
Wehr, Court Strikes Down Core of Gramm-Rudman, 44 CONG. QUART. 1559, 1563 (1986).
"The sequester cuts... were designed to be so appalling that to avoid them, the President
and Congressional factions would compromise longstanding budget disputes and produce
an alternative." Id. These sequester cuts were feared by both the President and Congress
because they "slash indiscriminately" from essential programs such as law enforcement and
air traffic safety. Id.
15 See Raising the Statutoiy Limit on Public Dept. Hearing on H.J. Res. 372 Before the Sub-
comm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1985) (Statement of Rep. Jim Saxton, member, Legislation and Na-
tional Security Subcommittee) [hereinafter Hearings). "The deficit is the No. I problem
facing our Nation. I hear about it in my weekly town meetings, I read about it in my
constituent mail, and 1 cannot sit down with any group of people who know how business
operates in our country without discussing it." Id.
"* See Wehr, Court Strikes Down Core of Gramm-Rudman, 44 CONG. QUART. 1559, 1563
(1986). Gramm-Rudman-type cuts are particularly difficult for Congress to make in an elec-
tion year like 1986. See id. at 1559. Rep. Mike Synar (D-Okla), one of the principal oppo-
nents of the Act, and a plaintiff in Bowsher v. Synar, commented, "Gramm-Rudman tried
to insulate Congress from the hard choices our Founding Fathers gave us and expected us
to make." Id. at 1562. The article noted, "the beauty of the invalidated procedure... was
also its fatal flaw." Id. at 1559.
, See 2 U.S.C.S. § 201(aXI) (Law. Co-op. 1986). The Act sets specified maximum deficit
limits starting at $171.9 billion in Fiscal Year 1986, gradually declining to zero for Fiscal
Year 1991. Id. at § 201 (aX I).
" See id. at § 251.
"' See id. at § 201(aXl).
" Supra note 17.
Gramm-Rudman Act
by-program cuts necessary to meet the maximum deficit amount."
Congress and the President then had thirty days to make alterna-
tive cuts."' If this was not accomplished, Section 252 (which actu-
ally took effect when the Comptroller General made his recom-
mendations to the President, requiring him to issue a
"sequestration order" containing the Comptroller General's re-
ductions) mandated that the Comptroller General's cuts were to
become effective .' This process was actually set into motion on
February 1, 1986.'. Before the cuts became effective, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled the pro-
cess unconstitutional, invalidating the proposed cuts. 8
From the outset, serious doubts were raised by Congressional
leaders and the President as to the constitutionality of the Act.'
In fact, in anticipation of a constitutional challenge, the Act pro-
vided for an extraordinary judicial review procedure for such is-
sues to expedite ascent of any such case to the Supreme Court.'7
The Act was also equipped with a "fallback" provision,' which
essentially provided that if any of the reporting provisions or au-
2, See 2 U.S.C.S. at § 251.
n See id. at § 252.
23 Id.
4 See Order, Emergency Deficit Control Measures for Fiscal Year 1986 (Feb. 1, 1986).
"See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1377, 1404 (D.D.C. 1986).
" See Hearings, supra note 18, at 60. (letter of Rep. Peter Rodino, Chairman House Judi-
ciary Committee). "While under the Constitution Congress can delegate the authority to
implement laws, it cannot delegate the authority to repeal laws. This is precisely what the
Gramm-Rudman proposal purports to do." Id. See 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1490, 1491
(Dec. 12, 1985). President Reagan stated, "In signing this bill, I am mindful of the serious
constitutional questions raised." Id.
2 U.S.C.S. § 274 (f) (Law. Co-op. 1986). Resolution of such a case is expedited. Id. 2
U.S.C.S. § 274(b) provides in pertinent part, "any order of the . . . District Court ...
under paragraph (I), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) shall be reviewable by appeal directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States." 2 U.S.C.S. § 274 charges the District Court and
the Supreme Court with "the duty ... to advance on the docket and expedite to the
greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought pursuant to subsection (a)."
Representative Mike Synar brought an action pursuant to 2 U.S.C.S. § 274 (aXl),joined by
eleven other Representatives. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1378 (1986). This
action was consolidated with an action brought pursuant to 2 U.S.C.S. § 274 (a)(2) by the
National Treasury Employees Union. See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1378. See also 2 U.S.C.S. §
274 (b) (appeal to the Supreme Court authorized).
2 U.S.C.S. § 274(0 (Law. Co-op. 1986). Rather than reporting to the Comptroller
General, the CBO/OMB report is submitted to a special joint committee of Congress. Id.
This committee must then submit a joint resolution to both Houses within five days, detail-
ing the Director's report. Id. The joint resolution is considered, and, when signed by the
president, is the basis for any sequestration. Id.
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tomatic deficit cutting procedures were found unconstitutional,
the budget cutting duties ascribed to the Comptroller General
were to be fulfilled by Congress by joint resolution.2 9
It is understandable that the first version of Gramm-Rudman
placed the heavy burden of automatic budget reductions on the
Comptroller General."0 Congress did not wish to be held responsi-
ble for the difficult decisions implicit in such actions.31 It is sub-
mitted that an invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman Act based on
the delegation doctrine would place the primary focus of the deci-
sion on this attempted abdication of responsibility, a result with
far greater practical applicability than hypertechnical distinctions
between the executive and legislative functions of the Comptroller
General.
II. THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
In Bowsher, the Supreme Court invalidated Section 251 of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985 as violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers.'2 The Court focused on
the role of the Comptroller General in the budget-cutting pro-
cess," and on the fact that Congress has the power to remove the
Comptroller for cause or by impeachment" as a basis for its ra-
tId.
Id. at § 252.
81 See Wehr, supra note 16, at 1562.
106 S. Ct. 3181, 3193-94 (1986).
- See id. at 3184-86, 3188 n.4, 3189, 3191-94. The Court discussed the Comptroller's
authority to initiate the sequestration process. See id. at 3192. The Court, in agreement
with the District Court, found that these powers were executive in nature. See id. at 3192.
See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-02 (D.D.C. 1986). But see Bowsher, 106
S. Ct. at 3200-02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Court's reasoning somewhat contradictory, "ex-
ecutive" powers may be performed by Congress under the "fallback" provision). See also
infra note 48 and accompanying text.
" See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188-91. At issue was the removal provision contained in the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which provides in pertinent part:
A Comptroller General or Deputy Comptroller General retires on becoming 70
years of age. Either may be removed at any time by-
A) impeachment; or
B) joint resolution of Congress, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, only
for
(i) permanent disability;
(ii) inefficiency;
(iii) neglect of duty;
(iv) malfeasance; or
Gramm-Rudman Act
tionale. Relying heavily on the bicameralism requirement set forth
in INS v. Chadha,35 the Court reasoned that this "control" of the
Comptroller General would enable Congress to oversee the execu-
tion of the laws, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.36 While this removal power had never been exercised in
the sixty years the GAO has existed, and could only be realized by
the difficult measures of impeachment or joint resolution, 7 the
Court felt that this represented sufficient control over the Comp-
troller General as to make Section 251 violative of the separation
of powers doctrine.38
Examination of the GAO reveals that it is indeed primarily an
investigative arm of the legislative branch.8 However, proponents
(v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.
31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982).
Justice White, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's view that this removal power
makes the Comptroller General controllable by Congress. See 106 S. Ct. at 3211-12. Justice
White noted:
The substantial role played by the President in the process of removal through joint
resolution reduces to utter insignificance the possibility that the threat of removal
will induce subservience to the Congress. As I have pointed out above, a joint resolu-
tion must be presented to the President and is ineffective if it is vetoed by him,
unless the veto is overridden by the constitutionally prescribed two-thirds majority
of Congress. The requirement of presidential approval obviates the possibility that
the Comptroller will perceive himself as so completely at the mercy of Congress that
he will function as its tool.
Id.
462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983).
' See 106 S. Ct. at 3192 (1986). The Court reasoned, "as Chadha makes clear, once
Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can
thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indirectly by passing new legisla-
tion." Id.
37 106 S. Ct. at 3218-19 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in urging
the Court to utilize severability as a means to preserve the important function of Gramm-
Rudman, pointed out that the removal power had never been exercised. 106 S. Ct. at 3219
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun indicated that the Court may be doing
the country a disservice by relying on the all but forgotten removal powers to invalidate
the Act; instead, it could preserve the legislation by holding invalid any future attempts to
remove the Comptroller by Congress. 106 S. Ct. at 3218 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Cf. Hook, Court Ruling on Budget Law Puts Spotlight on GAO Role, 44 CONG. QUART. 298
(1986) (split in Congress as to necessity of removal provision). Some members of Congress
favored the option of giving up the removal power, the existence of which was not known
to all. Id. But this measure was not favored by many Congressional leaders. Id. Rep. Jack
Brooks, (D-Texas), noted, "It is difficult to see how the GAO could be expected to con-
tinue to conduct independent and responsible audits of executive branch agencies if its
head were subject to removal at the will of the President." Id.
See 106 S. Ct. at 3194 (1986).
' See 31 U.S.C. § 3523(a) (1982) (GAO audits and investigates expenditure of public
funds); 31 U.S.C. § 719 (1982) (GAO makes reports on same to Congress or Committees).
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of the Act stressed that while the GAO has a crucial function in
its investigative capacity for the legislature, the supposed "con-
trol" aspect of such a relationship was not the reason Congress
chose the Comptroller General to be the person charged with the
automatic budget reductions.4 0 Rather, the Comptroller General
was chosen as a "neutral officer" '4 not to be influenced in this
role by Congress or the President.4' In fact, many members of
Congress were not even aware of the removal provision.4 3
Another aspect of the Court's reasoning in Bowsher which was
critical in its separation of powers analysis was the nature of the
functions the Comptroller General was to perform pursuant to
Section 251. 4 The Court adopted the reasoning of the District
Court,'4 finding that the functions were executive in nature." In
his concurrence, Justice Stevens refuted this analysis.'7 Justice Ste-
vens aptly pointed out the inherent contradiction in this reason-
ing: when the Comptroller performed the budget cuts pursuant to
Section 251, the function was considered executive in nature; yet
the Court found valid Section 274, the "fallback" provision which
ascribed the same function to Congress itself.'8
See Hook, supra note 37, at 300. The GAO has investigated improper expenditures in the
Nixon re-election campaign. Id. at 300. It has investigated improper funding by the Rea-
gan administration in Honduras, and has audited contested Congressional election ballots.
Id.
I See L.A. Daily Journal, April 24, 1986, at I, col. 2. Michael Davidson, legal counsel for
the Senate, stressed in his argument before the Supreme Court that, "Congress was only
seeking a neutral officer" to enact the cuts, not one under its control. Id. Davidson further
argued that cause for removal could not be based on a disagreement regarding the cuts. Id.
See Hook, supra note 37, at 300. "We must be independent of pressures from the executive
branch and pressures from Congress" to function effectively. Id. (Comptroller General
Charles A. Bowsher).
See L.A. Daily Journal, April 24, 1986, at I, col.2.
,' See id. at I, col.2.
" See Hook, supra note 37, at 298 (1986).
See 106 S. Ct. at 3191-92 (1986).
" See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (D.D.C. 1986). The court in Synar
found that the Comptroller essentially made judgments concerning the application of the
law, and also interpreted the new law, each executive functions. See id.
4 106 S. Ct. at 3194.
' See id. at 3194-3205.
See id. at 3200-02. Justice Stevens expressed his view that "the function may appropri-
ately be labelled 'legislative' even if performed by the Comptroller General or an executive
agency." d. at 3201. The plaintiffs in Bowsher held a similar view. See Synar v.United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1387 (D.D.C. 1986). They asserted that the cuts made would
effectively "nullify" and "override" existing laws, a legislative function. Id. Also central to
their argument was that this function was a nondelegable function per se of the legislature.
Id.
70
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The exact role of the Comptroller General also came under fire
in a similar context in Ameron v. Army Corps of Engineers.4" In
Ameron, the Army Corps of Engineers and other executive depart-
ments challenged the constitutionality of the Competition in Con-
tracting Act (CICA).' CICA empowered the Comptroller Gen-
eral to make determinations followed by recommendations or
affirmative action once a government contract bid was protested."
In an argument remarkably similar to the one set forth in Bowsher,
the executive department challenged this power on the grounds
that it constituted the exercise of executive and/or judicial func-
tions by a legislative branch officer, thereby violating the doctrine
of separation of powers." The Third Circuit's holding in Ameron
that there was no violation of the separation of powers doctrine3
is in conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Bowsher. The
Ameron Court recognized the GAO's role as an investigative arm
*" 787 F.2d 875 (3rd Cir. 1986).
" Publ. L. No. 98-369, subtitle D, 98 Stat. 1149-1201 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3553
et. seq.) (West Supp. 1985). The Act enabled the Comptroller General to review protests
made by bidders for government contracts. See 787 F.2d at 879. The Comptroller General
can make recommendations to agencies concerning the options they may exercise in recon-
sidering a bid (termination, re-bid, refrain from exercising options, or award a new con-
tract). Id. The Comptroller General can also "award a prevailing protester its bid and pro-
posal preparation costs, as well as its costs and attorneys fees in filing and pursuing the bid
protests." Id.
51 787 F.2d at 879.
52 See id. at 878.
" See id. at 886. The Third Circuit in Ameron took notice of the fact that the removal
power vested in Congress had never been exercised. See id. at 884. The court did not
consider the removal power question ripe for review, stating that an attempted removal
would be necessary before the removal provision could properly be challenged. Id. The
court also did not recognize the Comptroller General as a legislative branch officer, noting
that he is appointed by the president, and stating further that, "unlike heads of most de-
partments and establishments of the Government, [the Comptroller General] occupies a
dual position and performs a two-fold function." Id. at 885. The court recognized the
Comptroller General's role as an investigative arm of Congress as, "that of an officer of the
legislative branch of the Government." Id. The court then noted that the Comptroller's
function as the chief accounting officer of the government was an executive function. Id.
Essentially, the court in Ameron views the Comptroller General as independent from both
the executive and legislative branches, the removal provision notwithstanding. See Note,
GAO Bid Protest Procedures Under the Competition In Contracting Act: Constitutional Implication
After Buckley and Chadha, 34 CAm-. U.L. REv. 485, 494 (1985) [hereinafter Note, GAO Bid
Protest ProceduresJ (supportive of GAO's role pursuant to CICA, urging a finding of
constitutionality).
It should be noted that the Ameron case was decided before Bowsher, and may not stand
up to a renewed challenge after the Supreme Court's holding in Bowsher.
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of the legislative branch." By referring to the statute which cre-
ated the GAO, the concurrence in Ameron further stressed the
Comptroller General's role as an officer of the legislative
branch. 8
Ameron underscores the inadequacy of the separaton of powers
analysis when dealing with agencies such as the GAO." The classi-
fication of the authority delegated as legislative or executive
should not be the primary focus of judicial inquiry, rather the
scope of that authority should be scrutinized.57 For the GAO to
function effectively, it must perform some executive-type func-
tions," but it should not perform the task of making national pol-
icy decisions in the place of Congress, as Gramm-Rudman would
have permitted.5 When the "fallback" provision was activated,
this policy-making authority was removed from the Comptroller's
hands, and placed back into the hands of Congress."
III. THE FALLBACK FAILS
By striking down Section 251 of the Gramm-Rudman Act,61 the
" 787 F.2d at 885.
" Id. at 893. Numerous other cases have recognized the GAO as part of the legislative
branch. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3191 (1986) (removal provision makes
Comptroller an arm of the legislative branch), Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374,
1394 (D.D.C. 1986) (removal provision gives Congress control over Comptroller); United
States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 220, 224 (1984) (GAO an auditing and inves-
tigative arm of Congress).
" See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3200, 3201 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
notes that there is no "definite line that distinguishes executive power from legislative
power." Id. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 87 CoLuM. L. Ruv. 573, 581-87, 605-59 (1984) (refutes distinction between
executive branch and independent agencies; strict separation of powers analysis of agency
functions not realistic at present time).
" See Brooks, supra note 12, at 132-33.
- See Ameron, 787 F.2d at 885. The GAO's role as the chief accounting officer is essen-
tially an executive function. See id. See Note, GAO Protest Procedures, supra note 53, at 498
(Comptroller General must have some executive abilities to effectively monitor governmen-
tal bid procedures).
"e See supra notes 12, 16, 48 and accompanying. text.
" See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194 (1986). The Court did not order the
"fallback" provision to come into play, but "permitted" it. Id. Congress' options were as
follows: affirm the spending cut order that was to take effect on March 1, 1986 which had
been invalidated by the district court; eliminate the removal provision; or reduce the fed-
eral deficit by joint resolution - the "fallback" provision. See Wehr, Court Strikes Down Core
of Gramm.Rudman, 44 CONG. QUART. 1559, 1562 (1986).
" Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3194 (1986).
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Court permitted the "fallback" provision of the Act to take ef-
fect. 2 Congress' actions subsequent to the implementation of the
"fallback" provision highlight the difficulty that politicians have in
cutting federal spending due to political accountability." Rather
than making "tough" cuts, which could have potentially cost votes
in the 1986 elections, the cuts proposed represent softer, less po-
litically painful budgetary reductions." Also, although the dead-
line which should have initiated the "dreaded snapshot"" auto-
matic cuts, passed, no such automatic cuts were implemented."
Congress' failure to effectuate these difficult cuts indicates that
the delegation of responsibility for these cuts to the Comptroller
General was for the purpose of avoiding political accountability,
rather than for a legitimate use of delegation. While delegations
of authority are proper for various reasons, such as technical ex-
pertise on the part of the agency or official, or for the practical
purpose of assigning ministerial duties, the delegation involved in
Gramm-Rudman was nothing less than the wholesale abdication of
responsibility for an important legislative function.
IV. GRAMM-RUDMAN AND THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE: AN
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
While the Court's ruling in Bowsher may have had the unfortu-
4' See id.
See Gettinger, Deficit-Cutting Proposal Seeks To Avoid Cuts. 44 CONG. QUART. 2179, 2179
(1986). The plan by the House and Senate constituted a technical compliance with Gramm-
Rudman, "enough to avoid politically sensitive votes on uniform budget cuts required by
Gramm-Rudman." Id. Various members of the House and Senate scoffed at the plan,
pointing out that while it complied in a strict sense with Gramm-Rudman, the plan repre-
sented "no real savings or revenues." Id. See Gettinger, House, Senate Pass Deficit-Cutting
Measures, 44 CONG. QUART. 2258, 2258 (1986). The plan "steers a course between the em-
barrassment of inaction and the pain of tax increases or program cuts. It relies largely on
asset sales, better collection of taxes and budgetary expedients to reduce the deficit." Id.
Among the asset sales is the sale of Conrail, the nationalized railroad. Id.
" See Gettinger, Fidgety Congress Inches Toward Adjournment, 44 CONG. QUART. 2519,
2519 (1986). Rep. John Edward Porter commented, "[oipponents of Gramm-Rudman
should feel pretty good today. Congress has once again practiced the politics of delay and
rendered the dreaded snapshot . . . a paper tiger." Id.
See id.
-Id.
7 See Wehr, supra note 16, at 1562. See also Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could
the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1276 (1985) (some delegations of au-
thority are advisable, such as those involved with control of pollution and the regulation of
the trucking industry).
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nate result of delaying the reduction of the federal deficit, 68 the
Court's choice was the correct one. The deficit problem is surely
one of great magnitude, which is precisely why Congress, and not
an agent of Congress, should assume the responsibility in seeing
that it is reduced. 9 However, while the results of Bowsher satisfy
this aim, it is submitted that the Court should have utilized the
delegation doctrine to invalidate Secton 251. By invoking the del-
egation doctrine, which has renewed significance, 70 the Court
would have sent a strong signal to Congress, making it clear that
the task of reducing the deficit, as well as other essential national
policy decisions, should be carried out by Congress itself, and not
a subordinate of Congress. 71
A primary concern of Congress in enacting Gramm-Rudman
was whether it violated the delegation doctrine. 72 In challenging
the constitutionality of the Act, the plaintiffs in Bowsher invoked
this doctrine.7 4 The district court rejected the argument.75 On ap-
s See Gettinger, supra note 64, at 2519.
" See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3204 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
observed Congress may delegate authority to its agents who act in furtherance of legislative
activities. See id. at 3202. Justice Stevens stressed that Congress may not delegate its au-
thority to make policy "that will bind the Nation and thus is 'legislative in character and
effect' " to one of its agents. Id. at 3204 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8,
1986). See Brooks, supra note 12, at 137. Congressman Brooks argued forcefully that this
type of authority cannot be delegated to anyone, rather, Congress itself must make choices
of this magnitude. Id.
to See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47, 952-54 (1983). The Court in Chadha in-
ferred that the delegation doctrine may be due for a revival. The Court wrote, "tlhere is
unmistakable expression [in the records of the Constitutional Convention] of a determina-
tion that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step deliberate and deliberative
process." Id. at 959. While not dispositive of the issue in Chadha, the Court nonetheless
sent a strong signal to Congress to legislate more efficiently. See id. See also Goldsmith, INS
v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749, 757
(1984) (revival of doctrine consistent with Court's model of public administration); Com-
ment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha. A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33
EMoRY L.J. 953, 1020-22 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Rulemaking] (Chadha indicates a
renewed philosophy regarding delegation by the Supreme Court leading to a possible revi-
val of the doctrine).
"1 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., Inc., 448 U.S. 607, 685
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist observed, "'[first, and most abstractly
[the delegation doctrine] ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental ad-
ministration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of
our Government most responsive to the popular will." Id.
" See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519-28 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-10, 433 (1935).
18 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
14 See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3193 n. 10; Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1377, 1382
(1986).
" See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1382-85 (D.D.C. 1986). The District Court also rejected the
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peal, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue, 78 relying instead
on the separation of powers doctrine to hold that the Act was
unconstitutional.77
The delegation doctrine has been employed by the Supreme
Court only twice to strike down statutes.7' However, it should not
be inferred that the delegation doctrine is no longer good law. 7'
'core functions' analysis propunded by the plaintiffs. See id. at 1385. This analysis purports
that the budget cutting function granted to the Comptroller General is non-delegable per
se. Id. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 148. In rejecting this argument, the district court
noted that the "appropriations power is similar in nature to the taxing power, which has
been successfully delegated to the President." Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1385-86 (quotingJ.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Cf. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at
3202-04 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Congress cannot delegate this type of power to an
agent). Justice Stevens wrote:
If Congress were free to delegate its policy making authority to one of it agents, it
would be able to evade the 'carefully crafted constraints spelled out in the Constitu-
tion.' That danger - congressional action that evades constitutional restraints - is not
present when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an inde-
pendent agency.
Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)). Justice Stevens implied that while
the "core functions" of lawmaking may be delegable, it cannot be delegable to an agent of
Congress. Id.
The plaintiffs in Synar, in asserting that certain "core functions" were nondelegable,
cited dictum of Chief Justice Marshall which stated, "[tihe line has not been exactly drawn
which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legisla-
ture itself, from those of less interest" which may be delegated. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at
1385 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). The district court
rejected this argument noting that no case holding directly supported this proposition, and
furthermore, a discernible standard to distinguish "core" functions from "non-core" func-
tions was lacking. See 626 F. Supp. at 1385. But see Brooks, supra note 12, at 148-49 (intent
of the Framers of the Constitution was to make Congress' power over the purse
nondelegable).
Another argument set forth by the plaintiffs in Synar and Bowsher was that the delegation
authorized the Comptroller General to override or nullify laws by cutting the funding of
federal programs, and that such a delegation was invalid per se. See 626 F. Supp. at 1387.
The district court rejected this argument, citing cases which had upheld delegations per-
mitting officials to make similar determinations. Id. See, e.g., United States.v. Rock-Royal
Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 545-46 (1939) (Secretary of Agriculture given extensive control
over milk industry); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 45 (1939) (Secretary of Agriculture
granted power to regulate tobacco industry). However, these cases cited by the district
court involved ministerial decision making, not legislative policymaking.
, 106 S. Ct. at 3193 n.10.
" Id. at 3194.
79 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935); Pan-
ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935).
" See Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., Inc., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist wrote on the limited use of the delegation
doctrine since its brief heyday in the 1930's:
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While the Court has not specifically employed the doctrine by
name, it has struck down unconstitutional delegations using a dif-
ferent rationale, holding for example, that the statute is overly
vague or is violative of due process.80 Also, although the Supreme
Court has not relied specifically on the doctrine, state courts con-
tinue to employ it regularly." The Court's language in Chadha
has led some scholars to predict a revitalization of the doctrine.8"
Since the 1930's, and before its decision in Chadha, the Supreme
Court could uphold broad delegations of authority with the
knowledge that a curb on such delegations existed in the form of
the legislative veto, which was invalidated by the Chadha Court.8 3
[In] my opinion decisions such as Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan... suffer from none
of the excesses of judicial policymaking that plagued some of the other decisions of
that era. The many later decisions that have upheld congressional delegations of
authority to the Executive Branch have done so largely on the theory that Congress
may wish to exercise its authority in a particular field, but because the field is suffi-
ciently technical ... the most that may be asked ... is that Congress lay down the
general policy and standards that animate the law.
Id. Justice Rehnquist recognized the viability of the delegation doctrine as opposed to the
largely discredited doctrine of "substantive due process" with which the delegation doc-
trine is often associated. See id. at 574-75. It is submitted that the "technical" rationale for
the delegation of authority expounded upon by Justice Rehnquist is not applicable to the
delegation attempted by Gramm-Rudman, an area in the unique realm of Congressional
discretion.
" See Schoenbrod, supra note 67, at 1289 (Court employs different reasoning in striking
down excessive delegations, doctrine still relevant).
sI See, e.g., Thygesen v. Callahan, 74 I1. 2d 404, 407, 385 N.E.2d 699, 703 (1979) (maxi-
mum check-cashing and money order rates, inadequate standards); Texas Antiquities
Comm. v. Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924, 930-31 (Texas 1977)
(overbroad language in antiquities code); Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 784,
104 N.W.2d 227, 235 (1960) (arbitrary promulgation of regulations with criminal sanc-
tions); Allen v. Board of Barber Examiners, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1020, 102 Cal. Rptr.
368, 372 (1972) (inadequate standards in state rate-setting statute). See generally Note, Ad-
ministrative Law: The Delegation Doctrine and the Imposition of Criminal Sanctions Through
Agency Regulations, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1321-22 (1983) (states have been more strin-
gent in their review of standards).
" See Goldsmith, supra note 70, at 737 (Court's decision in Chadha could lead to revival
of doctrine); see also Comment, Rulemaking, supra note 70, at 1020 (Chadha indicates dele-
gation doctrine still viable).
" Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969-70 (White, J., dissenting) (legislative veto useful tool for
Congress). Justice White observed, "The legislative veto balanced delegations of statutory
authority in new areas of governmental involvement, the space program, international
agreements on nuclear energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustments of federal pay rates."
Id. Cf. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 4 (1986) (legislative veto means by which Congress could maintain control over agencies
after delegating power to those agencies); Note, Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: De-
fining a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE LJ. 1493, 1499 (1985) [hereinafter Note,
Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine] (the legislative veto prompted numerous standar-
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While the legislative veto was not the only form of congressional
oversight in existence, it was among the most effective and widely
used." The use of the legislative veto by Congress gave rise to
numerous broad delegations of authority.85 While the Court os-
tensibly relied on the "standards" test" (which required that ade-
quate standards exist for the agency or official to whom power was
delegated to insure compliance with Congressional intent) in up-
holding broad delegations of authority,87 implicit in such decisions
was the Court's knowledge of the existence of the legislative veto,
an effective means of congressional oversight."
The reasons for reviving the delegation doctrine are twofold,
one relating to the degree of accountability which Congress
should have in the formation of national policy, 89 the second hav-
dless delegations of legislative power). While the Court did not specifically refer to the
legislative veto in any cases upholding Congressional delegations of authority, it is submit-
ted that the existence of such a curb served to influence the Court's decisions.
" See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969-74 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White enumerated the
practical uses of the legislative veto as a means of controlling extensive delegations of
power in modern government. Id. See generally Schwartz, supra note 5 (veto an effective
means of overseeing delegated power): Note, Re-Separating the Powers, supra note 5
(favorable view of legislative veto in modern government); Note, Impoundment Control Act,
supra note 5 (critical of Chadha decision).
" See Note, Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 83, at 1500-01 (use of
legislative veto incompatible with standards doctrine); see also Bruff & Gellhorn, Congres-
sional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. RPrv.
1369, 1381-1409 (1977) (study of five regulatory proceedings, indications that Congress
left many points unresolved, used legislative vetoes to control agency action).
' See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (Emergency Price Control Act
found to have adequate standards). Yakus was decided subsequent to the use of the first
legislative vetoes in the 1930's, and expanded upon the test set forth in J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Hampton required an "intelligible princi-
ple" to guide the agency to whom power was delegated. Id. at 409. This was expanded
upon in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) setting forth the requirement of
"legislative standards", which delegate "subordinate rules". See Schechter 295 U.S. at 530;
Panama Refining 293 U.S. at 421. The Yakus Court went further, calling for more "defi-
niteness and precision" in the standards. 321 U.S. at 425-26.
7 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625 (1963) (vague statute regarding allocation
of water by executive official satisfied standards test); American Power & Light Co. v.
S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (standards-"unduly or unnecessary", "unfairly or inequita-
bly" found to be adequate).
" See Note, Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 83, at 1500.
' See Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[ilt is the hard choices, and not the
filling in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected representatives of the people
... the buck stops with Congress and the President," when making national policy deci-
sions. Id. See generally Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
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ing a more practical basis, focusing on congressional oversight of
the day-to-day functions of administrative agencies.' 0 A revived
delegation doctrine would not only force Congress to establish
more stringent standards for these agencies but would also assure
that an accountable body politic would be responsible for imple-
menting major policy decisions. 1 It is submitted that while no
standards are adequate to validate the delegation of authority at-
tempted in Gramm-Rudman, a revitalization of the delegation
doctrine, coupled with a clearer standards test elucidated by the
Court, would serve to aid Congress when drafting post-Chadha
delegations of authority.
A. The Delegation Doctrine and Political Accountability
One of the fundamental principles of our democracy is that the
parties entrusted with forming national policy should be held ac-
countable to the electorate."2 In times of economic crisis, it is
tempting for legislators to abdicate this responsibility so that they
are not damaged by the passage or administration of unpopular
laws."9 A revived delegation doctrine of the type favored by Jus-
tice Stevens in his concurrence in Bowsher v. Synar," or alterna-
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 64 (1982) (delegation doctrine prevents legislators from taking the
credit for legislation without taking the corresponding risks or blame); Cf. Bunn, Irwin &
Sido, No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter Delegation
Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 341, 343 (1983) (delegation doc-
trine increases accountability).
0See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J., dissenting).
o See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
- Cf. THE FEDERALS, No. 70 at 455 (H. Jones ed. 1961). James Madison wrote of the
problems which may be encountered were the executive composed of a council. Madison
warned against the shunning of responsibility; "[i]t is shifted from one to another with so
much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the opinion is left in suspense
about the real author." Id.
" See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (case
decided during the Depression); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (De-
pression-era case). See generally Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Repub-
lic, the Laws, and Delegation of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 445 (1977) (economic crises
tend to produce excessive delegations of power). Professor Schwartz wrote, "[tihe
Schechter-type delegations represented a democratic loss of nerve ... throughout the
depression-racked western world, people turned to the strong leader, vesting him with un-
precedented powers." See id. at 445.
" 106 S. Ct. at 3202-05 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens did not take issue with
the possibility that the type of authority granted the Comptroller could be delegated to the
executive or to an independent agency; he did, however, distinguish between "policy con-
siderations that bind the Nation" and other functions that do not "rise to this level." Id. at
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tively by Congressmen Synar and Brooks,' 5 would further the
principle of accountabilty." Justice Stevens believes that Congress
should not be able to delegate national policymaking authority to
one of its own agents." Congressmen Brooks and Synar go one
step further, stating that the type of sweeping authority delegated
to the Comptroller General by Gramm-Rudman should be non-
delegable per se.95 It is submitted that both of these views further
the proposition that Congress or the President must take responsi-
bility for national policymaking.
B. The Delegation Doctrine After Chadha: Further Justification for
Revival
Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan" and A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United States,100 the Court has
relied principally on the standards test to refute constitutional
challenges to statutes based on the delegation doctrine.10' The
Court has employed the standards test to uphold broad delega-
tions of power, often by narrowly construing the broad language
3203 n. 20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" See Brooks, supra note 12, at 145 (type of authority delegated should be nondelegable
per se). "The nondelegation doctrine remains our most effective barrier against massive,
broad delegation of lawmaking power from the politically accountable legislature to
unelected administrators. Some delegations are fundamentally too excessive for a democ-
racy; by virtue of their size alone, such delegations should be struck down." Id. Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 307, 336 (1976) (Congress
should not delegate legislative tasks).
" See supra notes 89 and 95.
See 106 S. Ct. at 3205 (Stevens, J., concurring); supra note 93.
e See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
'' See Comment, supra note 70, at 1020. After Chadha, "[if] standards are lacking, Con-
gress has not performed its fundamental constitutional role as legislator." Id. "The pri-
mary emphasis is on the language of the statute itself land]. . . [ilf it does not sufficiently
delimit the power of an agency by its own terms, then the delegation in unconstitutional."
Id. at 1018.
Often, the Court has construed broadly worded statutes with a narrow reading in order
to uphold them. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336,
342-45 (1974) (narrow reading of Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952 to avoid
constitutional conflict); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124 (1958) (narrow reading of Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 to avoid constitutional question). This is especially
true where the Act involves the fundamental rights of a citizen. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 124.
See also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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used.10 2 However, since the Court invalidated the legislative veto
in Chadha,103 the technique of narrow construction is no longer as
effective when determining whether the legislature has delegated
,too much authority. '" The legislative veto had traditionally pro-
vided Congress with a method for overseeing federal agencies.'"
With the legislative veto invalidated, it is submitted that the pre-
Chadha standards test, calling for "sufficiently definite and pre-
cise" 106 standards to allow a court to establish "whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed" 1 7 is no longer adequate. The Court
should have seized the opportunity presented by Bowsher v. Synar
to set forth a clearer standards test, even though the clearest set
of standards would not justify the Gramm-Rudman delegation of
I" See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625 (1963) (broad language granted execu-
tive official power to make decisions allocating water to various states, standard ruled ade-
quate); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1953) (overbroad statutory power given
to legislative committee, narrow reading applied). Commentators have objected to the nar-
row reading approach, claiming that judicial interpretation is not an effective means to
limit regulatory agencies' range of discretion. See, e.g., Ginnane, The Control of Federal Ad-
ministration By Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. REv. 568, 593 (1953)
(history and criticism of legislative veto); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064,
1074 (1981) (search for definite standards often futile).
' See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59. The Court's broad language discreetly signalled to
Congress the need for stricter statutory guidelines. Id. By invalidating the legislative veto,
the Court removed an external device often relied on implicitly by courts upholding broad
delegations of power. Id.
1- Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White observed,
"[wlithout the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain
from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with the hopeless task of writing laws
with the requisite specificity or ... to abdicate its lawmaking function." Id. at 968. The
"hopelessness" of this task is not clear, but it is submitted that the Court no longer has the
option of tailoring the wording of statutes to avoid finding unconstitional delegations.
I" See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White be-
lieved that the legislative veto should not have been invalidated, due to its usefuleness as a
device Congress could use to oversee agencies. Id. at 968. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn,
Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 1369, 1381-1409 (1973) (general overview of use of legislative vetoes); Javits & Klein,
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
445, 459 (1977) (defense of resolutions as acceptable means of implementing policy); Wat-
son, Congress Steps Out:- A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL L. REV. 983,
989-90 (1975) (critical overview of legislative veto).
1I" See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (Emergency Price Control Act
upheld notwithstanding vague standard to guide Price Administrator in setting maximum
wartime prices).
107 See id. at 425. See Schoenbrod, supra note 67, at 1249-74 (present standards test is
inadequate, proposes a "qualitative" approach in evaluating standards).
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CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar was the correct one, in
terms of immediate results. However, by relying on a strict separa-
tion of powers analysis, the Court ignored the far more useful
challenge raised as to the constitutionality of Gramm-Rudman.
Had the Court followed the lead set forth in Chadha and invali-
dated the Act based on its sweeping delegation of authority to the
Comptroller General, it would have achieved the same immediate
results. More importantly, however, the decision would have
served as a strong warning to Congress and the President that
they cannot abdicate their responsibility for important policy deci-
sions, thereby providing greater precedential value in the post-
Chadha analysis of congressional delegations.
John D. Beling
s See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1389. The District Court found that the
Act contained adequate "standards, definitions, context and reference to past administra-
tive practices" to provide an "intelligible principle to guide and define administrative deci-
sionmaking." Id. However, as Congressman Brooks points out, the budget base projections
of total revenues and outlays on which the Comptroller is to base his cuts are extremely
subjective and often arbitrary figures. See 2 U.S.C.S. § 251 (aX2) (Law. Co-op. 1986);
Brooks, supra note 12, at 148-52. It is submitted that even if the standards provided the
Comptroller are adequate to satisfy the standards test, Congressman Brooks' view, that
delegations of this magnitude are non-delegable per se, is correct.
